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COMMENTS
PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND
SUNSHINE LAWS - A NEEDLESS CONFLICT
Exclusive recognition,' long the keystone of collective bargaining
in the private sector,2 also has become the predominant mode of
bargaining in the public sector. In response to the growth in the
number of public employees over the past decade and to increasing
employee unionization and militancy, a majority of states3 and the
District of Columbia4 have enacted legislation governing public sec-
tor collective bargaining. Most of these statutes authorize the recog-
nition of a single organization as the exclusive representative for the
employees.' Others require a majority union to represent the inter-
1. Exclusive recognition means that the organization selected or designated by a majority
of the employees of a particular bargaining unit has the obligation and right to act as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees of the unit, without regard to their
membership or nonmembership in that organization. See M. LEIBERMAN & M. MOSKOW,
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TEACHERS 244 (1966); Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recogni-
tion and Minority Union Rights in Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1004 n.1
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Exclusive Recognition].
2. D. WOLLET & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS 2:24 (1974).
3. Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Ver-
mont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See BNA's GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. RF-49 51:
1011 et seq. (1976) [hereinafter cited as GERRI. For an overview cf the current status of
public sector bargaining statutes see Brown, Federal Legislation for Public Sector Collective
Bargaining: A Minimum Standards Approach, 5 TOLEDO L. REV. 681, 695-706 (1974). The
authorization for collective bargaining in state legislation has been phrased in terms of public
employees generally or in terms of specific classifications such as state employees, municipal
employees, public school employees, firefighters and policemen. See notes 5-9 infra. Postal
service employees are granted collective bargaining rights by The Postal Reorganization Act
of 1970. 39 U.S.C. §§ 1201-09 (1970). Executive Order No. 11491 provides collective bargain-
ing for federal employees. 34 Fed. Reg. 17609 (1969).
4. Exec. Order No. 70-229 (D.C. 1970), as implemented by DISTRICT PERSONNEL MANUAL
ch. 25A (GERR RF-106 51:6011 (1975)).
5. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.560(a)-(b) (1976) (GERR RF-129 51:1115) (teachers); id. §
23.40.100(a)-(b) (GERR RF-129 51:1111-12) (public employees); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3544
(1976) (GERR RF-112 51:1418-19) (public school employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-
471(1) (1975) (GERR RF-108 51:1612) (municipal employees); id. § 10-153b(e) (Cum. Supp.
1976) (GERR RF-108 51:1625) (teachers); CONN. P.A. 566, L. 1975 § 2 (GERR RF-1038
51:1620) (state employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4004 (1975) (GERR RF-104 51:1712)
(teachers); id. tit. 19, § 1306 (1975) (GERR RF-104 51:1711) (public employees); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 447.307(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-89 51:1811) (public employees); GA. CODE
ANN. § 54-1305 (1974) (GERR RF-24 51:1911) (firefighters); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-8(a)
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(Supp. 1975) (GERR RF-126 51:2015) (public employees); IDAHO CODE § 33-1273 (Cum. Supp.
1975) (GERR RF-126 51:2112) (teachers); id. § 44-1803 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (GERR RF-20
51:2111) (firefighters); IND. STAT. ANN. § 20-7.5-1-10 (1975) (GERR RF-104 51:2314) (teach-
ers); id. § 22-6-4-7 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-104 51:2318) (public employees); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 20.14-.15 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-93 51:2414-15) (public employees); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 72-5415 (1972) (GERR RF-124 51:2518) (teachers); id. § 75-4327(d) (Cum. Supp.
1975) (GERR RF-88 51:2513-14) (public employees); Ky. REV. STAT. § 345.030(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-124 51:2611) (firemen); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 967(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-108 51:2815-16) (public employees); id. tit. 26, § 979-F (GERR RF-
126 51:2822) (state employees); id. tit. 26, § 1025 (GERR RF-126 51:2826-27) (university
employees); MD. CODE ANN. art. 77, § 160A(e) (1975) (GERR RF-109 51:2912) (public school
employees); PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES & RESOLUTIONS ch. 13A-5
(1975) (GERR RF- 102 51:2924) (county employees); BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 1, § 115,
117(c) (1968) (GERR No. 266, E-4 to E-5) (municipal employees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
150E, § 4 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-122 51:3012) (public employees); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 423.211 (1967) (GERR RF-126 51:3113) (public employees); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
179.63(6) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-123 51:3211) (public employees) id. § 179.77 (GERR
RF-123 51:3215-16); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.500(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-107 51:3411)
(public employees); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41-2204 to 44-2207 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (GERR
RF-112 51:3517) (nurses in health-care facilities); id. §§ 59-1603 - 1606 (GERR RF-112
51:3512-14) (public employees); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-838 (1975) (GERR RF-94 51:3616)
(public and utility employees); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.160(2) (1975) (GERR RF-107 51:3714)
(local government employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:8 to :10 (Supp. 1975) (GERR
RF-108 51:3813-14) (state employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Cum. Supp. 1976)
(GERR RF-99 51:3912-13) (public employees); NEW YORK CITY, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 54,
§ 1173.3.0(1) (1972) (GERR RF-40 51:4162) (municipal employees); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-
38.1-11 (1971) (GERR RF-1 51:4312-13) (teachers); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 548.4 (Cum.
Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-105 51:4513) (firefighters and policemen); id. tit. 70, § 509.2 (1972)
(GERR RF-105 51:4516) (school employees); ORE. REV. CODE §§ 243.666 - .682 (1975) (GERR
RF-104 51:4612-14) (public employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.1-5 (Supp. 1975) (GERR
RF-126 51:4819) (firefighters); id. § 28-9.2-5 (1970) (GERR RF-126 51:4821) (policemen); id.
§§ 28-9.3-3 to -5 (GERR RF-124 51:4815) (teachers); id. § 28-9.4-4 (1970) (GERR RF-124
51:4812) (municipal employees); id. § 36-11-2 (Supp. 1975) (GERR RF-124 51:4811) (state
employees); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 3-18-3 (1974) (GERR RF-98 51:5011-12) (public employ-
ees); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154-c-1, § 6 (GERR RF-66 51:5212) (Cum. Supp. 1976)
(firefighters and policemen); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-20a-4 (Supp. 1975) (GERR RF-126
51:5311) (firefighters); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1991(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-126
51:5425) (teachers); id. tit. 21, § 1583 (GERR RF-107 51:5411) (state employees); id. tit. 21,
§§ 1722(a)(8), 1723 (GERR RF-126 51:5419-20) (municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 41.59.090 (Supp. 1975) (GERR RF-112 51:5620) (teachers); id. § 28B.16.100 (Supp.
1975) (GERR RF-112 51:5623) (higher-education teachers); id. § 28B.52.030 (GERR RF-112
51:5622) (community college faculty); id. § 41.56.060 (GERR RF-96 51:5612) (local govern-
ment employees); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(d)(1) (1974) (GERR RF-99 51:5820) (munici-
pal employees); id. § 111.83 (GERR RF-91 51:5813) (state employees); WYo. STAT. ANN. §
27-267 (1967) (GERR RF-94 51:5911) (firefighters). California's Local Public Employee Or-
ganizations statute provides that a public agency may adopt rules for certifying representa-
tives including exclusive recognition. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507 (West Cum. Supp. 1976)
(GERR RF-112 51:1414). Exclusive recognition is provided as well by Executive Order No.
11491, § 10(a) dealing with federal employees, 34 Fed. Reg. 17609 (1969), as amended, Exec.
Order No. 11616, 36 Fed. Reg. 17319 (1971), and by The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970,
39 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (1971).
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ests of all the employees,' though these have been interpreted to
authorize exclusive recognition.' A few statutes establish "members
only" recognition'; still others do not define representative recogni-
tion.9 It is not surprising that the concept of exclusivity has been
extended into the public sector.'" The widespread adoption of exclu-
sive recognition in private sector state and federal labor legislation"
attests to its success and to its advantages over other forms of recog-
nition."
6. See, e.g., Los ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., EMPLOYEE RELATIONS ORDINANCE § 9 (1975) (GERR
RF-107 51:1430) (county employees); CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE art. XI.A, § 16.211 (1974) (GERR RF-81 51:1435-:1436) (city and county employees);
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 204, 206-08 (McKinney 1973) (GERR RF-88 51:4114) (public employ-
ees); PA. STAT. ANN. § 217.1 (1968) (GERR RF-129 51:4720) (firefighters and policemen).
7. See, e.g., N.Y. Public Employment Rels. Bd., Rules and Regulations, § 201.9 to .11 (2
CCH LAB. L. REP.-State Laws, N.Y. 47,427.11 (Oct. 17, 1969)) (adopted pursuant to N.Y.
Cry. SERV. LAW § 206 (McKinney 1973)).
8. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3528 (West Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-112 51:1414)
(state employees); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1289 (1967) (GERR RF-94 51:3617) (teachers).
9. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 450(3) (Cum. Supp. 1973) (GERR RF-69 51:1011) (firefigh-
ters); id. tit. 55, § 317(3); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 89-1303 to -1305 (1971) (GERR RF-24 51:1911)
(firefighters); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 78.470 to .480 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-103 51:2615)
(policemen); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 53.18.030 (Supp. 1974) (GERR RF-112 51:5625) (port
district employees).
10. See Exclusive Recognition, supra note 1, at 1013.
11. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.05(1) (1974).
12. Two other forms of recognition exist. The first is recognition of an organization as the
representative of its members only. This type of recognition is "inconsistent with the logic of
a collective negotiations system [for it] .. .would guarantee maximum instability in the
employer-employee relationship [and] would be chaotic and impractical." D. WOLLET & R.
CHANIN, supra note 2, at 2:22. The second alternative, proportional representation, is consis-
tent with collective bargaining because any agreement reached will apply to all bargaining
unit employees. Id. at 2:22. It operates through the use of a negotiating council composed of
members appointed by the various organizations in proportion to their relative strength in
the bargaining unit. The council then deals with the employer. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13085
(West 1975), repealed by CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1976). Inherent defects
in such a system are that proportional representation divides the representatives on the
employees side and transfers the competition of views between the contending organizations
to the bargaining table, thereby impairing the process of reaching an agreement through
collective negotiations. R. DOHERTY & W. OBERER, TEACHERS, SCHOOL BOARDS, AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: A CHANGING OF THE GUARD 75 (1967). See D. WOLLET & R. CHANIN, supra note 2,
at 2:22-:23. It thus weakens the solidarity of the employees at the bargaining table and
permits the employer to use one competing organization against another. See R. DOHERTY &
W. OBERER, supra at 75-76. For a discussion of other problems arising from proportional
recognition see R. DOHERTY & W. OBERER, supra at 75-76; D. WOLLET & R. CHANIN, supra note
2, at 2:22-:23; Note, Municipal Employment Relations in Wisconsin: The Extension of Pri-
vate Labor Relations Devices into Municipal Employment, 1965 WIs. L. REV. 671, 673
[hereinafter cited as Extension]. Exclusive recognition, on the other hand, promotes order-
lines and stability. D. WOLLET & R. CHANIN, supra at 2:23. Exclusivity gives the exclusive
organization authority; authority leads to responsibility and a stronger, more mature ap-
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The pattern of bargaining under exclusivity is clear. Once a ma-
jority union is designated as exclusive representative, minority un-
ions or individual employees need not be accorded equal treat-
ment.' By definition, exclusivity prohibits both minority organiza-
tions and individual employees from negotiating a labor agree-
ment. The employer has the positive duty to bargain with the
chosen representative and the negative duty to bargain with no
other.'5 He must avoid actions that violate the exclusive representa-
tive's bargaining rights. In addition, the employer must refrain
from initiating action that has the aim of diminishing the effective-
ness of the exclusive representative. 7 To violate these duties is to
commit unfair or prohibited labor practices."
Not only must the public employer reach labor agreements solely
through negotiations with the exclusive representatives of the public
employee, he also must adhere to the "opening meeting," ".anti-
secrecy," or "sunshine" laws commanding that formal action by
state or local governing bodies be introduced, deliberated upon, and
adopted only at public meetings." The potential conflict between
these obligations makes the question of what constitutes "negotiat-
ing" of a public sector labor agreement one of peculiar and crucial
importance. It is necessary to decide precisely which communica-
tions to the employer/governing body are part of the bargaining
process, and thus to be conducted only by the exclusive representa-
proach toward negotiations. See E. SHILS & C. WHITTIER, TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 261 (1968); D. WOLLET & R. CHANIN, supra note 2, at 2:24. For a
discussion of other advantages of exclusivity see Lullo v. Firefighters, 55 N.J. 409, -, 262
A.2d 681, 691 (1970); E. SHILS & C. WHITTIER, supra at 261; D. WOLLET & R. CHANIN, supra
note 2, at 2:22-:24; Extension, supra at 108-10, 119.
13. See Exec. Order No. 11491, §§ 7(c), 10(e), 14, 19(d), 20, 21(a), 34 Fed. Reg. 17608-14
(1969), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11616, 36 Fed. Reg. 17319 (1971); D. WOLLET & R.
CHANIN, supra note 2, at 2:24-:33.
14. Exclusive Recognition, supra note 1, at 1011.
15. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1944).
16. Exclusive Recognition, supra note 1, at 1012.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); Quaker State Oil
Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40, 45-46 (3d Cir. 1959); Opinions of Council, 1 PERB 1-536
(Apr. 16, 1968).
19. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 39, § 23A (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
1708(3) (McKinney 1969); Wis. STAT, ANN. § 66.77 (1974). Approximately 32 other states also
have open meeting statutes. For a compilation of this statutory authority see Wickham, Let
the Sun Shine In! Open Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and
Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 480, 480 n.2 (1975). The statutes generally are inter-
preted to allow for closed negotiations, provided final action on the tentative agreement is
taken in an open-meeting. See notes 85-88 infra & accompanying text.
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tive. For example, if the governing body holds a regularly scheduled,
open meeting while a public employees' labor agreement is under
negotiation, the question arises whether the individual employees or
a minority organization has a right to appear and speak at such a
session.
This issue confronted the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in City of
Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. WERC.20 Negotiations for a
teacher's contract had reached an impasse. At a regularly scheduled
school board meeting at which pickets and several hundred teachers
were present, the president of the majority organization spoke urg-
ing the board to resume negotiations. Immediately thereafter a Mr.
Holmquist, speaking for an ad hoc committee of teachers, read a
petition requesting that resolution of the fair share provision2 issue
be deferred. Following the meeting, the board adjourned into execu-
tive session to consider the unresolved issues and adopted an offer
excluding a fair share provision.22
The exclusive representative subsequently filed a complaint with
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission" alleging that
the school board, by listening to Mr. Holmquist at the meeting, had
committed an unfair labor practice: prohibited negotiating with one
other than the exclusive collective bargaining agent.2" The WERC's
finding that the board had committed such an unfair labor prac-
tice25 was affirmed by the circuit court and by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court.26
Although both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion in
20. 69 Wis. 2d 200, 231 N.W.2d 206 (1975).
21. A fair-share provision is a clause in a collective bargaining agreement providing that
nonmembers of the exclusive representative's organization pay "their proportionate share of
the cost of the collective bargaining process and contract administration .... " WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 111.70(1)(h) (1975). Such a provision is permissible under the Wisconsin statute. Id.
§ 111.70(1).
22. 69 Wis.2d at -, 231 N.W.2d at 210-11.
23. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) is "an administrative
body charged with the responsibility of administering statutory policy with respect to both
public and private employees." Id. at __, 231 N.W.2d at 208.
24. Id. at __, 231 N.W.2d at 211.
25. The WERC found that the school board had violated Section 111.70(3)(a), which
provides: "It is a prohibited practice for a municipal employer . . . 1) To interfere with,
restrain or coerce municipal employees in the exercise of their rights [to form labor organiza-
tions and to bargain collectively through the representatives of their choice] . . . 4) To refuse
to bargain collectively with a representative of a majority of its employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit ...... WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111 .70 (3)(a) (1975) (GERR RF-99
51:5817-18).
26. 69 Wis.2d 200, 231 N.W.2d 206 (1975).
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City of Madison recognized the majority union as the exclusive
representative for collective bargaining, they differed as to what
constituted "negotiating" in public sector collective bargaining.
The majority declared that as long as a contract is under negotia-
tion, negotiating occurs whenever an individual teacher or minority
organization expresses its views on a negotiable topic at a public
meeting. In contrast the dissent distinguished private negotiating
sessions from regularly scheduled public meetings, asserting that
exclusivity in a bargaining relationship is a concept confined to the
sphere of private negotiations. Accordingly, the dissent argued that
exclusivity was no bar to the expression, at public meetings, of views
on negotiable subjects.
This Comment will analyze the rights of individual employees
and of minority organizations to speak at the employer's public
meetings, on subjects being negotiated by a public employer and an
exclusive representative. The "right to speak" issue may arise in
two contexts. 7 One context is as in City of Madison in which the
individual employee or minority organization attempts to speak at
a regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body; the other is
when a labor agreement bargained for in private is submitted for
ratification by the governing body, and the individual employee or
minority union attempts to speak at a public hearing.28 As City of
Madison illustrates, the determination of individual employee and
minority union rights depends upon how negotiating is defined. Be-
cause of the statutory requirement that meetings held by the gov-
erning bodies be open, this problem is unique to the public sector.
In analyzing the question of what should constitute "negotiating"
in the public sector this Comment will focus on the immediate
implications of the City of Madison definition. Also, the validity of
this definition will be examined in view of both the significant dif-
ference between the public and private sectors and the interplay
27. This is not to imply that the question raised here is unique to a system of collective
bargaining providing for exclusive representation as its means of recognition. The same prob-
lem can arise under other modes of recognition. See, e.g., West Valley Fed'n of Teachers,
Local 1953 v. Campbell Union High School District 24 Cal. App. 3d 297, 101 Cal. Rptr. 83,
80 LRRM 2446 (1972) (proportional representation). In that case the court adopted the
anomalous position that although a minority teacher's organization that was not represented
on the negotiating council was not precluded from presenting proposals to its public em-
ployer, it could not do so at a public meeting of the school board, but had to refer its proposal
to the negotiating council. Id. at -, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 85, 80 LRRM at 2467.
28. This was the situation in Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d
92 (1969).
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between sunshine laws and public sector collective bargaining stat-
utes.
ANALYSIS OF THE CITY OF MADISON DEFINITION
In deciding the central question of whether permitting a minority
organization to speak at a board meeting qualifies as bargaining the
court in City of Madison relied on a dictionary definition of negoti-
ating: "to communicate or confer with another so as to arrive at the
settlement of some matter: meet with another so as to arrive
through discussion at some kind of agreement or compromise
... ,"I The actions of both the school board and the minority
organization, however, did not fulfill that definition. Implicit in this
definition is the notion of a give-and-take relationship between two
parties across a bargaining table. The school board meeting in City
of Madison lacked this character; the board neither replied to Mr.
Holmquist's petition nor exchanged views with him.3" Moreover, the
minority organization spoke not at a negotiating session but during
the public forum portion of a regularly scheduled session of the
school board, a time when any citizen is permitted to express his
views on matters relating to the public schools.3 In reality, there-
fore, the court did not rely upon the dictionary definition, rather it
defined "negotiating" much more expansively. The court's analysis
of Mr. Holmquist's statement evinces a broader definition. Quoting
Board of School Directors v. WERC,32 the court stated: "[11f the
minority union representative is permitted to influence the decision
of the school board by his argument then he is truly 'negotiating.' ""
Thus the court defined "negotiating" not as ongoing bargaining
between two or more parties, but rather, as an attempt to influence
a governing body's decision on a negotiable subject. Presenting a
statement at a public meeting easily fell within this broad definition
of negotiation.
29. 231 N.W.2d 213, quoting Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 652, 168
N.W.2d 92, 99 (1969), quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1514(3d ed. 1969).
30. 69 Wis. 2d at -, 231 N.W.2d at 210 (emphasis supplied).
31. Id. at 216 n.5.
32. 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969).
33. 69 Wis. 2d at -, 231 N.W.2d at 214. In concluding that Mr. Holmquist's petition
constituted such negotiating, the court further noted that he desired to have the fair share
proposal deleted from the agreement. Id.
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S DEFINITION
The implications of defining "negotiating" as an "attempt to in-
fluence" are far reaching. If logically extended, the definition would
preclude any individual or association except the exclusive repre-
sentative, from appearing and presenting a statement on a negotia-
ble subject at a public meeting of the governing body.:" Certainly,
a private citizen is "attempting to influence" the governing body's
decision whenever he appears and speaks on a subject under nego-
tiation. Because minority organizations or individual employees
have been found to be negotiating by such an appearance, private
citizen groups similarly would be precluded. In the private sector,
bargaining with outsiders constitutes an unfair labor practice that
can be prohibited.35 In the public sector, however, the exclusion of
appearances by the public at open meetings would frustrate the
purposes of anti-secrecy statutes." Furthermore, any attempt to
curtail the rights of private citizens to speak on labor matters may
well infringe the first amendment right to free speech.37 Therefore,
to apply the City of Madison definition of "negotiating" arguably
would violate the constitutional right to speak on such matters.
Notably, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's application of its defini-
tion of negotiating was expanded in City of Madison beyond its use
in Board of School Directors. In Board of School Directors, the court
preserved the right of the individual employee to appear and speak
in his own behalf.38 In City of Madison, however, the court failed
to make even this distinction, instead prohibiting appearances by
teachers in either a personal capacity or as the representative of a
minority organization."
PRIVATE SECTOR LABOR LAW PRECEDENT
Because of the unique problems in public sector collective bar-
34. Although it is arguable that all statements made at public meetings on negotiable
subjects will not qualify as an "attempt to influence," in light of the facts of City of Madison,
it is difficult to imagine such a situation. As the minority noted: "Unless a speaker takes a
firm stand on both sides of the fence, it is difficult to see where a statement of position would
not be for or against a proposal or proposition." 69 Wis. 2d at __, 231 N.W.2d at 218.
35. See NLRB v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 449 F.2d 824, 831 (5th Cir. 1971).
36. See notes 91-94 infra & accompanying text.
37. See NLRB v. American Pearl Button Co., 149 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1945). See also Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
38. 42 Wis. 2d at __, 168 N.W.2d at 98-100; see Exclusive Recognition, supra note 1, at
1016.
39. 69 Wis. 2d at ___, 231 N.W.2d at 211-14.
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gaining, private sector principles have limited applicability. Private
labor law precedent nevertheless is a valuable and logical aid in
analyzing the validity of the "attempt to influence" definition of
negotiating,' especially in view of the marked similarities between
the provisions of the Wisconsin Municipal Employment Relations
Act and those of the National Labor Relations Act.4
Because the entire negotiating process can be, and is, regularly
conducted in private, there are no private sector cases directly on
point. There are, however, situations that parallel attempts by a
minority organization or individual employee to speak at public
meetings on a subject being negotiated by the employer and the
exclusive representative. Controversies in the private sector occur
when an individual employee, or several employees acting in con-
cert, present to the private employer a petition concerning condi-
tions of employment, and the employer responds to the demands.
Case law suggests that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
will not deem a private employer to have negotiated if (1) he in no
way encouraged or solicited a petition 3 and (2) he neither exhibited
an intent to deal nor actually dealt with the persons responsible for
the petition."
The City of Madison definition thus creates an anomalous situa-
tion. Although in the private sector the mere presentation of a peti-
tion to an employer does not comprise negotiating, under the Wis-
consin court's expansive definition of negotiating as "an attempt to
influence," in the public sector such a presentation does constitute
negotiating. Moreover, because of the protection provided in the
public sector by the anti-secrecy statutes, this broader definition is
unwarranted. These statutes assure the exclusive representative
40. D. WOLLET & R. CHANIN, supra note 2, at 6:1-:4; Note, The Validity of Exclusive
Privileges in the Public Employment Sector, 49 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 1064, 1065 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Exclusive Privilegesi.
41. Compare Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a)(1)-(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1)-(5) (1971) [hereinafter cited as NLRAI, with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(3)(a)(1)-
(4) (1974) (GERR RF-99 51:5817). Many other state public sector bargaining statutes are
similar to the NLRA. Exclusive Privieges, supra note 40, at 1065-66.
42. See D. WOLLET & R. CHANIN, supra note 2, at 4:1-:2.
43. Coast Radio Broadcasting Corp., 151 NLRB 1101, 58 LRRM 1574 (1965); Lawn-Boy
Div. Outboard Marine Corp., 43 NLRB 535, 53 LRRM 1342 (1963). See notes 45-46 infra &
accompanying text.
44. American Printing Co., 173 NLRB 73, 69 LRRM 1238 (1968). See notes 47-48 infra &
accompanying text. For a discussion of the meaning of "dealing with" see Comment, Protest
Groups and Labor Disputes - Toward a Definition of "Labor Organization": Center for
United Labor Action, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 796, 803-06 (1976).
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greater protection than exists in the private sector for they provide
that the representative may be present whenever a minority petition
is submitted, thereby affording the representative an immediate
opportunity to offer countervailing views. In the private sector, how-
ever, as petitions are presented in the absence of the majority repre-
sentative, no such opportunity exists. In view of this anomaly and
in view of the private sector precedent, the court's definition of
negotiating as "an attempt to influence" appears questionable. For
example, in Lawn-Boy Division Outboard Marine Corporation,"
the NLRB held that during negotiations with the exclusive repre-
sentative, receipt by company officials of an unsolicited petition
coupled with notification to the employees of its receipt was not an
unfair labor practice; as stated by the Board, because the corpora-
tion "was not responsible for the circulation of the petition, it can-
not be found that it sanctioned its circulation . . .simply by in-
forming the employees that it had been received."" Similarly, in
American Printing Co.,47 company officials who met with employees
concerning an unsolicited petition were deemed not to have negoti-
ated as they made no counterproposals and thus did not "bargain
directly" with the employees." Therefore, if a private employer
merely listens to or receives unsolicited proposals on negotiated sub-
jects, but in no way deals with the employees concerning their pro-
posals, he has not breached his statutory duty to negotiate solely
with the exclusive bargaining representative. That the proposals
may influence the employer in his dealings with the representative
apparently is immaterial.
FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTORS
Because government is the public employer, collective bargaining
in public employment differs significantly from that in private em-
ployment. In the private sector, collective bargaining is shaped pri-
45. 143 NLRB 535, 53 LRRM 1342 (1963).
46. 143 NLRB at 545. See also Coast Radio Broadcasting Co., 151 NLRB 1101, 58 LRRM
1574 (1965).
47. 173 NLRB 73, 69 LRRM 1238 (1968).
48. Id. at 73-76, 69 LRRM at 1239. See also Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
678 (1944), in which an employer was found to have committed an unfair labor practice by
ignoring the exclusive representative and directly making counterproposals to a group of
employees who had submitted a list of demands. Id. at 683-85.
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marily by market forces;4" in the public sector, collective bargaining
is responsive to both economic and political forces.'" Because the
true employer is always the public to whom all governmental offi-
cials are responsible,5 public sector agreements, though greatly in-
fluenced by economic factors of the market, also are "filtered
through the political process" in which strictly economic elements
combine with noneconomic considerations to yield a political deci-
sion."
Denying minority organizations and individual employees the
right to speak at public meetings impedes the political processes
through which public sector collective bargaining should and does
function.5 1 Political officials adopting a collective bargaining agree-
ment can be held responsible to the public at the polls. For this
portion of the political process to be responsive and reliable, how-
ever, citizens must have knowledge of the issues being negotiated,
of their implications, and of alternative proposals to those posed or
adopted. Thus the public is entitled to hear not only the views of
the majority organization but also those of individual employees
and minority organizations. To deny the public access to all the
points of view on a proposed collective bargaining agreement is
tantamount to denying citizens the information needed to make an
intelligent and informed decision through the political process. 4
Also, individual employees should be accorded the right to speak
on negotiable subjects at any public meeting of a governing body
because public collective bargaining, as part of the governmental
process, requires that "responsible political officials be entitled to,
if not obligated to, listen to the views of all those who have an
interest in the decision.""5 Permitting a representative of a minority
organization or an individual employee the right to speak on negoti-
able subjects at public meetings should not constitute negotiating
because (1) it gives the complainant no greater role in determining
the terms and conditions of employment than he would have had
prior to the introduction of collective bargaining into the public
49. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156
(1974).
50. Id. at 1159.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 1198-99.
54. Cf. id. at 1198-99.
55. Id. at 1198.
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sector;5" (2) it gives him no greater access to the employer than the
public or majority organization has;" and (3) it does not reduce the
advantage which the majority organization, as exclusive bargaining
representative, obtains by the collective bargaining process. At
most it reduces the majority union's ability to conceal an absence
of unanimous support for its position on every demand; "exclusive
recognition has never, in law or in fact, guaranteed the majority
union any such right to conceal."5
The other significant difference between the private and public
sectors arises because the public employer, as a governing body,
traditionally acts as a regulator.'" Even as it acts as an employer it
still is performing an administrative, governmental function; its
actions therefore must meet state and federal constitutional stan-
dards." Whether a minority organization or individual employee
can speak to a public employer who is contemporaneously the gov-
erning body must be analyzed within the scope of the protections
56. As Summers, supra note 49, points out, "public employees, even without collective
bargaining, can and normally do participate in determining the terms and conditions of
employment. Many can vote . . . and present arguments in the public forum. Because their
terms and conditions are decided through the political process, they have a right as citizens
to participate in those decisions which affect their employment." Id. at 1160.
57. Id. at 1198.
58. Id. at 1199.
59. Id.
60. Eisner, First Amendment Right of Association for Public Employee Union Members,
20 LABOR L.J. 438 (1969); Exclusive Recognition, supra note 1, at 1006; see D. WOLLET & R.
CHANIN, supra note 2, at 1:34.
61. U.S. CONST., amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
The first amendment is made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). It is well
established that public employees do not relinquish their first amendment rights as a result
of the public nature of their employment. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968).
Many state constitutions possess first amendment counterparts. E.g., CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 14; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9; VA. CONST. art. I, § 12; WIS. CONST.
art. I, § 4.
In Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551, 455 P.2d
827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969), the California Supreme Court explained the essential difference
between private and public employment by stating that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances a
private employer is not subject to the First Amendment." Id. at -, 455 P.2d at 835-36, 78
Cal. Rptr. at 731-32. But see Local 858 of A.F.of T. v. School District No. 1, 314 F. Supp.
1069 (D. Colo. 1970). Confronted with a question of the validity of granting exclusive privi-
leges to the majority union in light of first amendment rights, the court treated the constitu-
tional argument as "nothing more than appealing rhetoric." Id. at 1075.
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afforded by the first amendment grants of freedom of speech, assem-
bly, petition and association.
Granting exclusive recognition to a majority organization for
collective bargaining purposes, therefore, cannot prevent an indi-
vidual employee or a minority organization" from petitioning their
public employer about employment grievances."3 Yet the definition
of "negotiating" adopted in City of Madison deprives minority or-
ganizations and individual employees of the right to petition that
governmental body which has both the control over and the power
to alleviate grievances. 4 By defining "negotiating" in such a man-
ner, the Wisconsin court has created a conflict between the public
sector collective bargaining statute and a fundamental constitu-
tional right. Accordingly, the statutory scheme may not withstand
a constitutional attack under the "vague but inescapable 'over-
breadth' or 'less drastic means' tests." 5 Under this test restrictions
on first amendment rights are invalid if they restrain more freedom
than is necessary to achieve a legitimate governmental purpose, " for
"that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fun-
damental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
62. Under the first amendment the nexus between the freedoms of speech and association
is sufficiently close that comments on matters of public concern made by groups of individu-
als acting through an association should receive the same protection as comments made by
an individual. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967),
(extending the ruling of Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
377 U.S. 1 (1964)); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The controlling question is not
whether the statements are made individually or in concert, but rather whether there is a
compelling state interest justifying an infringement of personal liberty. NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
63. The term "grievance" is used here in its generic sense to mean any problem, concern,
or complaint. See generally Jackson v. United States, 428 F.2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Swaaley
v. United States, 376 F.2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967). In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), the
Court held that grievances for which the right to petition was created were not solely religious
or political ones but extended to any field of human endeavor. Id. at 531. Cf. Harrison v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 271 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. App. 1954) (a union cannot deprive
an individual employee of a private right to petition Congress); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge
No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, -, 113 A. 70, 73 (1921) (voiding union rule prohibiting members from
petitioning legislature in opposition to union's view).
64. See Exclusive Recognition, supra note 1, at 1015. In Swaaley v. United States, 376 F.2d
857, 862 (Ct. Cl. 1967), the Court of Claims held that "whatever rights a civil service employee
has under the first amendment include petitions to the head of his own department . ... "
In Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, -, 70 N.W.2d 605, 608 (1955), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that Article I, § 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution guaranteed the same
rights as those insured by the first amendment of the United States Constitution.
65. See Eisner, supra note 60, at 442-44.
66. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960).
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achieved." 7 The overbreadth test is applied absolutely so that if a
governmental action suppresses too much freedom it is unconstitu-
tional and will not be saved by a balancing or weighing of any
interest of the state against the rights of citizens." Under this analy-
sis the constitutional issue in City of Madison becomes a question
of to what extent freedom to petition must be stifled to maintain
the integrity of exclusive recognition."
Exclusive recognition does not require a denial of minority organi-
zations' and individual employees' rights of petition. The concept
of exclusivity alone does not prohibit a public employer from receiv-
ing, at public meetings, communications from either minority or-
ganizations or individual employees. 0 As one authority has stressed,
"everyone can be entitled to present his view even if precluded from
negotiations per se."' 1 Moreover, the policies supporting exclusive
recognition may be better fulfilled by allowing minority organiza-
tions and individual employees to testify at such meetings. The
exclusive representative, for example, would be compelled to ob-
serve its statutory duty to represent all the employees in the collec-
tive bargaining unit without regard to membership in the majority
organization." Furthermore, as it is possible with a majority union
representing only 51 percent of the employees, for 26 percent to pass
proposals binding upon all,73 one of the dangers of exclusivity lies
in the representative's opportunity to abuse its favored position.
Permitting minority statements at public meetings, however, would
protect against such abuse, thus preserving the integrity of exclusiv-
ity by exposing any unsupported proposals of the majority union.
The exclusive representative's statutory position as sole bargain-
ing agent would not be endangered if minority speech were permit-
ted, because the right to petition does not raise a correlative consti-
tutional duty on the part of the public employer to negotiate, re-
67. Id. at 488 (footnote omitted).
68. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967).
69. As noted, exclusivity is the most workable method of recognition in a collective bar-
gaining scheme; its use, therefore, should not be in question. See note 12 supra & accompany-
ing text.
70. See R. DOHERTY & W. OBERER, supra note 12, at 77, quoting T. STINNET, J. KLEINMAN
& M. WARE, PROFESSIONAL NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 42 (1966); M. LIEBERMAN & M.
MosKov, supra note 1, at 116; E. SHI.S & C. WHITTIER, supra note 12, at 77; Extension, supra
note 12, at 679.
71. M. LIEBERMAN & M. MOSKOV, supra note 1, at 116.
72. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Exec. Order No. 11491 § 10 E, 34 Fed. Reg.
17608 (1969), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11616, 36 Fed. Reg. 17319 (1971).
73. E. SHi.s & C. WHITTIER, supra note 12, at 216.
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spond to, or otherwise redress the grievance. 4 All that the public
employer is required to do is to receive the petition.75
In addition to the first amendment problem, the rights of individ-
ual employees also must be measured against the equal protection
requirements of the fourteenth amendment." As exclusivity in bar-
gaining is required for a functional bargaining process in the public
sector,77 the distinction between majority organizations on the one
hand and minority organizations and individual employees on the
other is a justifiable and permissible classification premised on a
compelling state interest-stable and peaceful labor relations in
public employment." Although the concept of granting representa-
tion to an exclusive group may fulfill the requirements of equal
protection in the abstract, it does not follow that every action taken
by an employer and by the exclusive representative will be constitu-
tionally acceptable. In essence, the question is: Does the special
privilege conferred upon the majority organization relate directly to
the proper execution of its duties as the exclusive representative?
The test for determining the validity of such exclusive privileges has
been delineated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which stated:
"Those rights or benefits . . .must in some rational manner be
related to the function of the majority organization in its representa-
tive capacity and must not be granted to entrench such organization
as the bargaining representative."7 Yet the City of Madison defini-
tion of "negotiating" may create an unwarranted exclusive privilege
for the majority organization: that is, the sole right to speak for all
74. See Exclusive Recognition, supra note 1, at 1016.
75. This is not to say that in dealing with dissident factions the employer may not exceed
his duty to receive a petition and thus commit an unfair labor practice. See notes 47-48 supra
& accompanying text.
76: U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
77. See note 12 supra.
78. Exclusive Recognition, supra note 1, at 1099; Exclusive Privileges, supra note 40, at
1073. See Local 858 of A.F. of T. v. School District No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970)
(implication).
79. Id. at - , 168 N.W.2d at 97, quoting the declaratory ruling of the WERC (emphasis
supplied by the court). Valid privileges for the exclusive representative include: checkoffs;
organizational use of the public employer's facilities for meetings; union security; use of
public employer's internal means of communication. D. WOLLETT & R. CHANIN, supra note 2,
at 2:29; see Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, ._, 168 N.W.2d 92, 97-98 (1969);
Exclusive Privileges, supra note 40, at 1069-70, 1073-74; Exclusive Recognition, supra note
1, at 1010-11, 1023-30. But see Local 858 of A.F. of T. v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp.
1069, 1074-77 (D. Colo. 1970); Bauch v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 237 N.E.2d 211,
289 N.Y.S.2d 951, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1968).
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the employees of a bargaining unit at public meetings.' For, as
noted previously, maintaining exclusivity does not preclude individ-
ual employees and minority unions from speaking on negotiable
subjects at public meetings;" indeed, allowing others to speak may
enhance the effectiveness of exclusivity.2 Moreover, "[i]t is doubt-
ful that public comment from any source will undermine the collec-
tive bargaining role of the exclusive representative,"83 as that repre-
sentative maintains the sole right to meet with the public employer
in closed sessions during which the "give and take" of true negotia-
tions takes place. Finally, it is anomalous to prohibit the speech of
individual employees or minority organizations on negotiable sub-
jects, yet to allow the general public to express their views at open
meetings. The words of a citizen alone, or through an organization,
sometimes might have as great or greater an influence than an indi-
vidual employee or minority organization. 4 Thus, the court's defini-
tion of "negotiating" in City of Madison may violate the equal pro-
tection clause by impermissibly distinguishing between public em-
ployees and other citizens who attend public meetings.
80. Whether the result of the court's definition can be characterized as an exclusive privi-
lege is debatable. The exclusive representative's sole right to speak at public meetings of the
governing body both possesses and lacks characteristics of an exclusive privilege. The right
is similar to such a privilege in that it does confer upon the majority organization an impor-
tant advantage. By permitting the exclusive representative to speak unhindered by other
employee organizations or individual employee presentations, the exclusive representative is
given a valuable forum in which to publicize its position, derrogate its opposition, and win
the public favor. This sole right to petition a governmental body is not granted in the private
sector in which a union may not prohibit even its own members from personally petitioning
a governmental body in opposition to the union position. See Harrison v. Brotherhood of Ry.
& S.S. Clerks, 271 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. App. 1954); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, 270
Pa. 67, __ 113 A. 70, 73 (1921). In City of Madison, the court has allowed the majority
organization to stifle all employee presentations, even those of the organization's members
speaking as individuals. 69 Wis. 2d at -, 231 N.W.2d at 211.
Unlike an exclusive privilege, however, the right is not granted pursuant to negotiations
between the exclusive representative and the public employer. Thus it is arguable that the
right is a part of the public employer's obligation to bargain solely with the exclusive repre-
sentative and is not an exclusive privilege.
Nonetheless, whether the right is an exclusive privilege or merely a part of the "obligation
to bargain" seems immaterial. For, if the right is an exclusive privilege, the test enumerated
above, see note 79 supra and accompanying text, is clearly applicable; if it is not an exclusive
privilege, the test is appropriate by analogy. Not only do some exclusive privileges fail to
satisfy equal protection requirements, but also some types of negotiating fail. For only negoti-
ating that is essential for maintaining an effective public sector collective bargaining process
should be deemed to fulfill the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
81. See notes 70-71 supra & accompanying text.
82. See notes 72-74 supra & accompanying text.
83. Exclusive Recognition, supra note 1, at 1016.
84. Cf. Summers, supra note 49, at 1198-99.
PUBLIC SECTOR
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN "ANTI-SECRECY" AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
STATUTES
Introduction of collective bargaining into the public sector pres-
ents a threshold question of whether collective negotiations can be
conducted in private sessions."5 The sunshine statutes in effect in a
majority of states necessitate this determination."8 Under such stat-
utes, parties generally select their respective negotiators or negotiat-
ing teams, formulate proposals, instruct their respective teams ac-
cordingly, and then proceed with the actual negotiations in closed
sessions." The tentative agreement and its final adoption, however,
must be considered in open meeting."8 All regularly scheduled meet-
ings of the governing body also must be open to the public. 9 The
sunshine laws, therefore, apparently permit individual employees
and minority organizations to appear and address the governing
body at its open meetings.
By defining "negotiating" to include statements made by individ-
ual employees and minority organizations at such meetings, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has created a conflict between the open-
meeting law and the public sector collective bargaining statute."'
Such a definition frustrates the policy expressed in the Wisconsin
open-meeting statute of public access "to the fullest and most com-
plete information regarding the affairs of government"'" during pub-
85. In the private sector, collective negotiations have long been conducted in closed meet-
ings in the belief that such negotiations cannot be successful under scrutiny of the public eye.
D. WOLLETr & R. CHANIN, supra note 2, at 4:1.
86. See note 19 supra & accompanying text.
Those states that have enacted some type of public sector collective bargaining statute and
sunshine law include: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin. See Wickham, Let the Sun Shine
In! Open-Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Local
Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 480, 480 n.2 (1973).
87. Basset v. Braddock, GERR No. 396, E-1 (Apr. 12, 1971), afJ'd, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla.
1972); see Talbot v. Concord School District, 114 N.H. 532, 323 A.2d 912 (1974); 54 Op. ATT'y
GEN. Wis. vi (1965). A number of statutes authorizing collective bargaining in the public
sector exempt negotiating sessions from the open-meeting statutes. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §
14.20.560(e) (1976) (GERR RF-129 51:1115); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17.3 (Cum. Supp. 1976)
(GERR RF-86 51:2415); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.220 (1975) (GERR RF-107 51:3717).
88. See note 19 supra.
89. See note 19 supra & accompanying text.
90. Cf Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MicH. L. REv.
885 (1973); Exclusive Recognition, supra note 1, at 1197.
91. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 66.77(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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lic meetings "open to all citizens at all times.""2 The court's defini-
tion, therefore, thwarts the basic purposes for adopting such anti-
secrecy statutes; for permitting only the majority organization to
appear and speak at open meetings curtails the public's right to
" 'go beyond and behind' the decisions reached [so as to] be ap-
prised of the 'pros and cons' involved . . . ,,91 in the governing
body's decisions on employment contracts.
Arguably no conflict exists between City of Madison and the pur-
pose of the Wisconsin sunshine law because the purpose of the stat-
ute is to allow citizens to obtain information rather than to convey
their opinions to governmental agencies. Such an argument, how-
ever, fails to recognize that citizens may not be aware of minority
positions and of whether such positions are being considered by the
governmental agency unless individuals and minority organizations
are allowed to present their views at open meetings. Moreover, pro-
viding information to the public is not the only purpose of open-
meeting laws. "Public meetings also may operate to provide officials
with more accurate information; individual citizens will be able to
correct factual misconceptions . ... 1
Furthermore, in holding that making statements at public meet-
ings constitutes "negotiating", the Wisconsin Supreme Court failed
to note that the government acts in a dual capacity as both a regula-
tor and an employer. When officials sit at a public meeting, they
are acting as regulators and during such meetings "[flormal nego-
tiations between the public employer and exclusive representative
• . . terminat[e] at least temporarily." 5 The sunshine statute re-
quiring that regularly scheduled meetings and public hearings on
tentative agreements be at open meetings thus does not contem-
plate that contributions made during such meetings constitute in-
puts to the negotiating process."
By defining negotiating as it did, the court failed to consider the
92. Id. at § 66.77(2)(d).
93. Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know, " 75 HARV. L.
Rirv. 1199, 1200 (1962).
94. Id. at 1201.
95. Exclusive Recognition, supra note I, at 1015.
96. See 54 Op. A'rr'y GEN. WIS. vi (1965): "In any event when the bargaining period is past
no final action should be taken . . . until [the proposalsi are made public and discussed in
an open meeting." [emphasis suppliedl. See also Basset v. Braddock, GERR No. 346, E-1
(Apr. 12, 1971), af 'd, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972). In Basset, the Florida Supreme Court
recognized that the consideration of tentative agreements and their adoption had to be open
to the public because this part of the negotiation process did not entail "negotiating." Id.
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effect of accepting a tentative agreement and exaggerated the influ-
ence upon a public employer effected by a minority organization or
individual employee's statement at a public meeting. For, as noted
by one commentator, in public employment "once an agreement is
reached at the bargaining table, many of the issues are largely fore-
closed; a heavy presumption arises against rejection of the agree-
ment even on budgetary grounds.""7 To rescind approval of an
agreement, expressing dissatisfaction with the terms would be in-
sufficient; rather, an individual employee or minority organization
at least would have to demonstrate to the public employer that its
assent to the agreement had been based on a misunderstanding of
the terms of underlying facts."8
Moreover, the public employer need only listen to the minority
union or individual employee, for he is under an affirmative duty
to avoid responding to or treating with them.99 Indeed, allowing such
groups and individuals a right to appear at public meetings and to
express their views on subjects under negotiation requires nothing
substantially different of the public employer than is accepted for
private employees. As a majority organization presents a tentative
agreement to its members for discussion and ratification, so too,
before ratifying a proposed agreement, a governing body, as repre-
sentative of the public, should be permitted to hear the views of all
citizens, including minority organizations and individual employ-
ees.
00
The policy and purposes behind public sector collective bargain-
ing statutes and sunshine laws are thus consistent. By defining
''negotiating" to include presentation by minority organizations and
individual employees at open meetings the Wisconsin Supreme
Court needlessly has created a conflict between the two types of
statutes. To exclude from the definition presentations by anyone or
any organization at such meetings, however, preserves the integrity
of both laws.
97. Summers, supra note 49, at 1197; see Central School District No. 1 & Wappinger Cent.
School Faculty Ass'n, GERR No. 489, B-12 (Feb. 5, 1973) (PERB decision).
98. See Central School District No. 1 & Wappinger Cent. School Faculty Ass'n, GERR No.
489, B-12 (Feb. 5, 1973) (PERB decision) (implication), in which New York's PERB stated:
"'[Tihe reneging was not based upon a misunderstanding as to any of the terms; rather it
was based solely on a change of mind. .. .' The Act [Taylor Law] does not compel either
party to agree to any proposal, but .... the Act does not countenance the withdrawal of an
agreement made." Id.
99. See notes 47-48 supra & accompanying text.
100. Cf. Summers, supra note 49, at 1198.
1976]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:159
CONCLUSION
Although exclusive recognition of a bargaining unit's majority
organization is desirable in public employment, 10 1 "negotiating"
must be defined so as to protect both the fundamental constitu-
tional rights of employees and the integrity of open-meeting stat-
utes. By defining "negotiating" as "an attempt to influence," the
court in City of Madison failed to achieve these aims. The City of
Madison definition succeeds only in raising questions as to the va-
lidity of the bargaining statute under both the first and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution'"2 and in placing the statute into
unwarranted conflict with the open-meeting law. 03
These problems could have been avoided by excluding presenta-
tions at open meetings from the definition of "negotiating." In pub-
lic employment disputes the best means of protecting both the con-
stitutional rights of individual employees and minority organiza-
tions and the integrity of open-meeting statutes is a provision within
the bargaining statute granting individual employees and minority
organizations the right to present, at open meetings, ideas and pro-
posals concerning subjects under negotiation.' 4 The appropriate
provision might state:
101. See note 12 supra.
102. See notes 62-84 supra & accompanying text.
103. See notes 85-100 supra & accompanying text.
104. A few states with public sector collective bargaining statutes provide for this. E.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-123 51:3213-13) (public employ-
ees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-99 51:3912) (public employ-
ees). A number of other states protect only the rights of employees acting individually.' E.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.600 (1976) (GERR RF-129 51:1115) (teachers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 4007 (1975) (GERR RF-104 51:1713) (teachers). Although such a provision does not circum-
scribe an individual's first amendment right to petition, it appears to violate statutory provi-
sions protecting the employee's right to form, join, assist or participate in any organization
of public employees, or refrain from such activity. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 20.8 (Cum. Supp.
1976) (GERR RF-86 51:2412) (public employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Cum. Supp.
1976) (GERR RF-99 51:3912-13) (public employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(2) (1974)
(GERR RF-99 51:8817) (municipal employees); see Exclusive Recognition, supra note 1, at
1016. Neither Alaska nor Delaware has such a provision. Such a provision also may abridge
the first amendment right of association. See notes 60-62 supra.
The New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. supra, does not limit
the right only to open meetings but provides that a public official can hear requests or the
views of an employee organization provided the exclusive representative is informed of the
meeting and all modifications in terms and conditions of employment are made only through
the exclusive representative. Whether it is desirable to allow the public employer to meet with
a minority organization or individual employee in private, especially if the majority organiza-
tion is not granted a right to be present at such meeting, is questionable. Such a situation
might foster hidden agreements between the minority organization and the public employer
or might encourage the minority organization to discredit the majority union for purposes of
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Nothing herein shall prevent public employees, individually or in
concert or through such representative as they may choose collec-
tively or individually, from presenting or making known their
positions and/or proposals to the appropriate governing body sit-
ting in open meeting'0 so long as (a) the exclusive representative
is provided an opportunity to speak at such meeting; (b) any
changes or modifications in terms or conditions of employment
are made solely through negotiations with the exclusive bargain-
ing representative; and (c) a minority organization shall not pres-
ent or process grievances.'"'
The insertion of such a provision into the public sector collective
bargaining statute alleviates the problems posed in this Com-
ment."7 Subsection (a), permitting the majority organization to
speak and thereby counteract unsubstantiated and self-serving
statements made by dissidents is designed to protect that organiza-
tion from unwarranted criticism and harassment by rival factions.
self-gain. Thus it is preferable to limit contacts between public employer and minority organi-
zations and individual employees to open meetings at which the exclusive representative will
have the opportunity to speak in defense of its actions and proposals.
If the right to approach the public employer is limited to public meetings, a question arises
as to the validity of such a restriction on the right to petition guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. But constitutional law allows for the reasonable regulation of the place and manner of
the exercise of first amendment rights. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 826-27 (1974)
(restriction on the manner in which prisoner communications can be constitutional); Adder-
ley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (citizens do not have constitutional right to protest
whenever and however they please). Furthermore, the impact of statements made in private
in the absence of the exclusive representative is greater than of a statement at a public
meeting at which the exclusive representative is present and has the right to respond. Conse-
quently, to thus restrict the right of minority organizations and individual employees to
petition their public employer about subjects under negotiation is reasonable and necessary
to safeguard a compelling public interest-stable and peaceful relations in public employ-
ment. See note 78 supra & accompanying text.
105. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72:5415 (1972) (GERR RF-124 51:2518) (teachers).
106. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (GERR RF-99 51:3912-13) (pub-
lic employees).
The wording of subsection (c) may vary depending upon whether the right to present
grievances is granted to a minority organization. E.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 117.70(4)(d)(1)
(1974) (GERR RF-99 51:5820) (municipal employees). Moreover, the entire subsection may
become superfluous if the minority organization must be allowed to process grievances under
the first amendment right to petition. For a discussion of this problem and the problem of
processing grievances in the public sector when exclusive recognition is involved, see D.
WOLLET & R. CHANIN, supra note 2, at 2:26-:29, 5:47-:48, 5:48 n.165.
107. This provision eliminates the right to petition problem by allowing minority organiza-
tions and individual employees to petition at the open meeting. It also satisfies the equal
protection question by granting the same right to speak at public meetings to minority
organizations and individual employees that is granted to the majority organization. Finally,
the policy and purposes behind the open-meeting statute are not abrogated.
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Subsection (b) protects the integrity of exclusive recognition by
preventing the public employer from dealing with the minority or-
ganization or with individual employees at public meetings concern-
ing negotiable subjects. 0° Finally, subsection (c) prevents a minor-
ity organization from construing the right to speak at open meetings
as conferring the ability to represent its members during grievance
proceedings.
City of Madison reflects the problems that may arise in the ab-
sence of a right-to-speak provision. Unless states providing for both
open meetings and public sector collective bargaining incorporate
such a provision into their bargaining statutes, their courts inevita-
bly will confront the issues raised in City of Madison. If these states'
courts adopt the approach of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and
define negotiations broadly they will undermine the constitution-
ality of their public sector collective bargaining statutes.
108. See notes 46-48 supra & accompanying text.
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